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NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF CARE-LIABILITY FOR INJURY CAUSED BY OBVIOUS
DEFECT WHERE LESSOR CONTRACTED To REPAIR-Defendant, lessor of a
delivery truck, agreed with the lessee to maintain the vehicle in good condition and make regular inspections. The lessee's driver was not to make
any repairs or adjustments but was to deliver the truck to the lessor as it
needed repairs or as requested for inspection. Two years after the lease was
made, plaintiff-driver made a written request to the lessor for repairs
to the floor in the driver's compartment. Although plaintiff left the truck
overnight with the lessor and made several further requests, the floor was
not repaired. One month after notifying the lessor, plaintiff slipped on a
small spot where the metal was exposed and sustained severe injuries. In
an action against the lessor for negligence, the jury returned a verdict for
plaintiff. The trial court, however, granted the lessor's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the theory that there could be no
liability since the defect was obvious, and not concealed. On appeal, held,
reversed. Where by agreement a lessor has reserved control of the property
through the exclusive right and duty to repair, tort liability for injuries
incurred due to failure to repair may be imposed even though the defect
was apparent. Campbell v. Siever, (Minn. 1958) 91 N.W. (2d) 474.
The question of a lessor's liability for injuries caused by his failure to
repair as agreed usually is resolved in terms of •:control." If the lessor had
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control over the subject-matter, there is basis for liability for injury resulting from a defective condition; 1 without control there is no liability.2
Developed in landlord-tenant situations, the original reason for this principle was that one who is not able both to enter in order to repair3 and
to exclude people until the danger is abated should not be liable.4 The
same reasoning was applied in bailment cases.5 While most later decisions
retain the "control" requirement, often the kind of control actually
present is not that which was originally said to be necessary. It is not at
all settled that a contract to repair confers control sufficient to impose
liability. Many states declare that a mere agreement to repair confers no
control.6 Others hold that although a lessor may acquire control in the
sense of a privilege of entry, this is not sufficient. For instance, the New
York court stated that the landlord must have the "power and right to admit people to the premises and to exclude people from them." 7 "Exclusive control" is required in Ohio.8 But other states, while agreeing
that control is essential for liability, define it so that the type acquired
by a lessor through an agreement to repair is sufficient.9 Minnesota has
long held that an agreement to repair made by a landlord gives him implied authority to enter the premises and that this is control upon which
may be predicated duty and liability.10 But the trial court in the principal
case felt compelled to apply the rule that it is also essential that the
defect constitute a concealed danger; hence, there was no liability since the
defect was obvious.11 The court in the principal case agreed that such
is the usual rule but held it inapplicable where the defendant not only
reserved control of the truck for the purpose of keeping it in repair but
also provided that plaintiff and other drivers of the lessee were not to
make any repairs whatsoever.12 This decision gives a new meaning and

See Johnson v. Prange-Geussenhainer Co., 240 Wis. 363, 2 N.W. (2d) 723 (1942).
See Soulia v. Noyes, 111 Vt. 323, 16 A. (2d) 173 (1940); Huey v. Barton, 328 Mich.
584, 44 N.W. (2d) 132 (1950), noted 49 MICH. L. REv. 1080 (1951).
3 See Appel v. Muller, 262 N.Y. 278, 186 N.E. 785 (1933).
4 Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931).
5 Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Ry. Co. v. Merrill, 65 Kan. 436, 70 P. 358 (1902).
6 E.g., Caudill v. Gibson Fuel Co., 185 Va. 233, 38 S.E. (2d) 465 (1946); Berkowitz
v. Winston, 128 Ohio St. 611, 193 N.E. 343 (1934). See generally PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed.,
473-475 (1955).
7 Cullings v. Goetz, note 4 supra, at 290. But see Noble v. Marx, 298 N.Y. 106, 81
N.E. (2d) 40 (1948). Comment, 48 MICH. L. REv. 689 (1950).
8 Ripple v. Mahoning Nat. Bank, 143 Ohio St. 614, 56 N.E. (2d) 289 (1944).
9 Saturnini v. Rosenblum, 217 Minn. 147, 14 N.W. (2d) 108 (1944); Hodges v. Hilton,
173 Miss. 343, 161 S. 686 (1935).
10 Barron v. Liedloff, 95 Minn. 474, 104 N.W. 289 (1905); Saturnini v. Rosenblum,
note 9 supra.
11 The court cited O'Brien v. American Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012
(1910); 13 DUN. Dre., 3d ed., §6995a (1954); and 2 TORTS REsTATEMENT §§388 and 405
(1934). The Restatement is somewhat ambiguous on this point.
12 Principal case at 478. No supporting authority was cited.
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a new consequence to control. Where the control retained includes the
ability to exclude all others from repairing the vehicle, the consequence
is liability even for obvious defects. The decision does not, however, deviate significantly from results reached through other approaches in
analogous situations. That neither a landlord nor a bailor is liable when
the harmful defect was obvious is supported by ample authority.13 But
in the special situation where the lessor has covenanted to repair the
subject-matter, courts allowing liability usually rule that when notified of
the defect a lessor who fails to repair within a reasonable time is negligent,14
and the apparentness of the defect bears only on the question whether
the injured person had assumed the risk or was guilty of contributory
negligence.15 Further, this conduct could be found only where the plaintiff was aware of the specific defect causing the injury, fully comprehended the danger it presented, and failed to exercise reasonable care in
the face of the danger.16 It often is said that once the lessee has given
notice of the need for repair, the lessor assumes the risk of injury to
others and only after an unreasonable time has passed does the lessee again
assume the risk.17 He does so then only because it is unreasonable to rely
any longer on performance by the lessor and to protect himself he ought
to make the repairs.18 Thus recovery often is allowed even though the
defect was apparent. Such an approach seems preferable to dealing with
the problem in terms of "control." It is suggested that the law should
impose a duty of care with regard to any defects where there is an agreement to repair plus an additional relationship such as lessor-lessee or
bailor-bailee,19 since there is a strong probability of reliance by the lessee
or bailee that the lessor or bailor will repair.20 This would provide a justifiable basis for tort liability which enables the uncertain and unhelpful
concept of "control" to be discarded.
Donald R. Jollifje
13 E.g., Spinks v. Asp, 192 Ky. 550, 234 S.W. 14 (1921) (landlord); Blankenship v.
St. Joseph Fuel Oil Co., 360 Mo. 1171, 232 S.W. (2d) 954 (1950) (bailor).
14 Hudson v. Moonier, (8th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 96.
15 Runnels v. Dixie Drive-It-Yourself System, 220 Miss. 678, 71 S. (2d) 453 (1954);
Witte v. Whitney, 37 Wash. (2d) 865, 226 P. (2d) 900 (1951); Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Ore.
223, 178 P. 234 (1919).
16Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 A. 262 (1935).
17 Peterson v. Zaremba, 110 N.J. L. 529, 166 A. 527 (1933); Bland v. Gross, IO N.J.
Misc. 446, 159 A. 392 (1932), affd. 110 N.J. L. 26, 163 A. 891 (1933).
18 Lebovics v. Howie, 307 Mich. 326, 11 N.W. (2d) 906 (1943); Busick v. Home Owners
Loan Corp., 91 N.H. 257, 18 A. (2d) 190 (1941); Stoops v. Carlisle-Pennell Lumber Co.,
127 Wash. 82, 219 P. 876 (1923).
19 Note, 83 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1035 (1935).
20 Merchants' Cotton Press and Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87
(1916); Scholey v. Steele, 59 Cal. App. (2d) 402, 138 P. (2d) 733 (1943); Anglen v. Braniff
Airways, (8th Cir. 1956) 237 F. (2d) 736. See 2 TORTS llEsTATEMENT §357 (1934). On the
general subject, see 163 A.L.R. 300 (1946) (landlord-tenant); 46 AL.R. (2d) 404 (1956)
(automobile bailor-bailee).

